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RECENT CASES.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-SUCCESsIvE GRANTS-POSSESSION By LAST GRANTEE.
-EARNEST V. LITTLE RIVER LUMBER Co., 75 S. W. 1122 (TENN.).-Where
the State made three successive grants of the same land, and after those
claiming under the third grant had been in adverse possession for seven
years, the grantees in the second grant brought suit, claiming that such
adverse possession had vitalized their intermediate grant. Held, that by
the Statute of Limitations the effect of.the adverse holding by defendants
was to draw to and vest in them the absolute and indefeasible title which
the first grantees received from the State under their grant. Wilkes, J.,
dissenting.
Consider the grants as made to A, B and C. The ruling that A's
title passes to C is contrary to the weight of authority. That the estate in
the disseisee is divested and vested in the party holding adversely is well
supported by the authorities. I Ant. & Eng. Encic. (2d ed.), 833. It cannot
be said that disseisin works a transfer of title. 2 Prest. Abst. 284; Parker
v. Prop. of Locks, 3 Metc. 98; Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402; Smith
Ld. Cas. 529. Since a separate and distinct title is created in C the principles
of adverse possession would seem to make C's title good as against A, but
not good as against B. C's title is indefeasible by any one as to whom
his holding has been adverse. It has not been adverse to B. As long as
the paramount title remained in A, B, possessing a colorable title equal
with C, cannot be disseised. The statute cannot apply unless there has
been adverse possession. This decision overrules Coal Creek Co. v. East
Tennessee, lO5 Tenn. 563.
BANKRUPTCY - INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS - PETITIONERS - PROVABLE
CLAIM .- IN MATTER OF HORNSTEIN, io AM. B. R. 308., 122 FED. 266.Sec.
59b of the Bankruptcy Act provides that three or more creditors having
provable claims of a proper amount against any person may file a petition
to have him adjudged a bankrupt. Sec. 57g provides that claims of cred-
itors holding a preference shall not be allowed unless the preference be
surrendered. Held, that there is a distinction between provable and allow-
able claims and that the petitioners, though holding a preference in the
form of an attachment, had provable claims and might file a petition.
The existence of the distinction is admitted in Collier, Bankr. (4th ed.),
442, but elsewhere it is declared that creditors holding attachments may not
file petitions. Id. 4o8. The distinction is ignored and the words used
interchangeably in Re Conhain, 97 Fed. 923. In Re Rogers Milling Co.,
lO2 Fed. 687, it is said that one who has received a preference has not
a provable claim and may not file a petition. This rule has been expressly
sustained in other cases. In re Schenkein, 113 Fed. 421; In re Burlington
Malting Co., 1o9 Fed. 777. In the principal case is a clear and logical
argument based on the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, which seems to estab-
lish the existence of the distinction in the face of the weight of authority
opposing it.
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BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-ENFORCING WAIVER OF ExEMPTIONS.-LocK-
WOOD V. EXCHANGE BANK OF FORT VALLEY ET AL., io AM. B. R. i07; 190 U. S.
294.-A bankrupt's promissory notes contained a written waiver, as authorized
by the laws of the State, of all right of homestead exemption. Held, that
the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction to enforce the rights of holders of
the notes having no lien.
Under the Act of 1867 it was held that the court of bankruptcy had
no jurisdiction over exempt property other than to hear and determine the
claims of the bankrupt, if disputed. The decision of all questions as to
property which had been adjudged exempt, including the results of a
waiver, was to be left to the State courts. In re Bass, 3 Woods 382. Under
the Act of 1898 it has been held in the district court that the bankruptcy
court would take jurisdiction to enforce a waiver, even in the absence of
a lien. In re Woodruff, 96 Fed. 317. But it has also been held that the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over exempt property concerns only
its being set aside. in re Jackson, 116 Fed. 46; In r- Hatch, io2 Fed. 28o;
In re Seydel, 1I8 Fed. 2o7. In the principal case it is decided by the United
States Supreme Court that under the act of 1898 that rule holds which was
laid down with regard to the earlier act. For the remedy of the creditor,
see In re Ogilvie, 5 Am. B. R. 374.
CONTRACT OF SERVICE-QUANTUM MERUIT-REcOVERY.-WAGNER V. EDISON
ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., 75 S. W. 966 (Mo.).-In complying with an
ordinance requiring all electric wires to be placed underground, several
companies acted jointly through a committee. This committee elected one
of its members as engineer for the work. Held, that, although the engineer
was a member of the committee, he could recover on the quantum ineruit
for services rendered as supervising engineer. Robinson, C. V., Gault, V.,
dissenting.
No decision is found directly in point. Bank directors, acting outside
of their usual official duties, have been granted compensation where the
evidence raised a fair presumption that such was the intention of the parties.
Plu v. First Nat. Bank, 130 Mass. 391; Ward v. Polk, 70 Ind. 309. The rule
was applied to railroad directors and trustees in Cheeney v. Ry. Co., 68 Ill. 570,
and to corporation presidents in Santa Clara Mining Ass'n. v. Meredith, 49 Md.
389. We see no reason why the doctrine should not control the case in
question. Fitzgerald, etc., Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98.
FRAUDULENT DEBTOR-NECESSARY PARTIES.-ScHNEIDER V. PATTON ET AL.,
75 S. W. 155 (Mo.) .- Held, that in an action by a judgment creditor against
a fraudulent grantee to set aside a conveyance of real estate made by the judg-
ment debtor, the judgment debtor is not a necessary party.
The law is unsettled on the point, although there are but few decisions
in direct conflict. On the ground that the conduct of the judgment debtor
is to be investigated, Bump, Fraud. Con. (ist ed.), 522, has considered him
a "necessary party" to the suit. The rule is not well supported and is
modified in the 3d ed. of the same work, 548, to read "proper party." See
also Story, Eq. Pl. (4th ed.), i96. The debtor was held a necessary party
in Lawrence v. Bank, 35 N. Y. 320; Lovejoy v. Ireland, 17 Md. 535; a proper
party in Gaylord v. Kelshaw, I Wall. 82; Birdwell v. Butler, i3 Tex. 338;
and not a necessary party defendant in Leach v. Shelby, 58 Miss. 68i; Potter
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v. Phillips, 44 Iowa 353. The tendency of the law is towards the ruling of
this court. Taylor v. Webb, 54 Miss. 42; Laughton v. Harden, 68 Me. 208.
INSOLVENCY-PRFERENCEs-RIGHTS OF CRDITORS.-PowFRs-TAYLOR DRUG
Co. v. FAULCONER ET AL., 44 S. E. 204 (W. VA.).-An insolvent debtor, with
intent to prefer certain of his creditors, sold his property to a third party
who was cognizant of the facts. The proceeds of the sale were paid to the
preferred creditors. Held, that such sale was not fraudulent in fact. An
intent to prefer is insufficient to establish a fraudulent intent. McWhorter,
P., and Dent, J., dissenting.
There is a distinction between the effect of a transfer by a debtor in
failing circumstances and an intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.
If the intent is to defraud, a valuable consideration will not save the transfer.
Gans v. Renshaw, 2 Barr (Pa.) 36. The statute of 13 Eliz. is aimed only
at intended fraud. Bank v. Carter, 38 Pa. 453. Without clear proof of
fraud the sale is valid. Meade v. Smith, 16 Conn. 346; Kirkland z. Snow,
20 Conn. 23. The burden of proof rests upon the creditor impeaching the
preference. Glen v. Grover, 3 Md. 212; Johnson v. McGrew, ii Iowa 151.
The fact that the debtor was about to abscond was held in Garr v. Hill, 9
N. J. Eq. 21o, not to invalidate the sale. A secret motive for preference is
immaterial, Bun v. Ah, 21 Pa. 387, but the law will not tolerate any form
of trust to the benefit of the debtor. Johnson v. Whitwell, 24 Mass. 71;
Dalton v. Currier, 4o N. H. 237. If the debtor contrives that other creditors
shall never be paid this is not a bona fide preference and the transfer may
be set aside. Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; James v. Ry. Co., 6 Wall. 752;
Garden v?. Clapp, 113 Mass. 335; Smith v. Schwed, 9 Fed. 483.
JUDGMFENT-WANT OF JURISDIcTION-SERVIcE OBTAINED BY TRICK.-
FRAWLEY, BUNDY & WILCOX V. CASUALTY Co., 124 FED. 259.-Held, that a
service of summons obtained by fraud is invalid and the defendant is not
bound by a judgment rendered thereon.
Service obtained by fraud is invalid. Williams v. Reed, 29 N. J. L. 385.
And the one upon whom it is made may have an action therefor. Wanger
v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35. But it would seem that. if the service is in behalf of
one not a party to a fraud, it will be good. Nichols & Co. v. Goodheart, 5
Ill. Ap. 574; Adriance v. La Grave, 59 N. Y. iiO; though the principle of
this ruling is doubted. Alderson, Jud. Writs, 272. But if the one upon
whom the fraudulent service is made enters a plea, the irregularity is
waived, Manhard v. Schott, 37 Mich. 234; Gilson v. Powers, 16 Ill. 355;
even though a motion to dismiss the suit has been made and overruled.
Peters v. R. Co., 59 Mo. 4o6; Gorner v. Slate, 8 Blackf. 567. If judgment
goes against the plaintiff by default, some cases hold that it cannot be col-
laterally attacked. Shee v. La Grange, 78 Iowa ioi; McMullen v. State, los
Ind. 334. Other courts, when suit is brought on the judgment, treat it as
void. Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624; Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 26o.
And this better accords with the rule that the judgment of a court which
has no jurisdiction is void. I Black, rud., 218.
MASTER AND SERVANT-BLACKLIST-BoYER V. WESTERN UNION TEL. Co.,
124 FED. 246.-Held, that an employer, having discharged employes for be-
longing to a labor union, has the right to enter the reason of their discharge
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in a book and invite other employers to examine it, even though the latter
then refuse to hire the discharged employes.
It is well established that the jurisdiction of equity does not extend
to granting an injunction in cases of libel or slander or false representation,
AL. v. BLOW Er AL., 75 S. W. (Mo.).-Held, that in a suit to foreclose a
114 Mass. 69; Mayer v. Stonecutters' Ass'n., 47 N. J. Eq. 51g. A boycott
does not fall within this rule; Casey v. Union No. 3, 45 Fed. 135; and an
injunction may issue in such a case. Oxley Co. v. Coopers' Union, 72 Fed.
695. But it is held to apply so as to prevent an injunction being obtained
against the continuing of a blacklisting agreement. Worthington v. Waring,
157 Mass. 42r. Nor, it would seem, is such an agreement actionable at
law. R. R. Co. v. Schaffer, 65 0. St. 414; Bohn Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223,
234. Though, if the employe suffers an injury by reason of a false entry
in the blacklist an action would be. Hundley v. R. Co., lo5 Ky. 162.
MORTGAGES-PROPRIETARY MEDIcNE-REcEIvaERsIP--NoTIc.--TUTTLE ET
AL. V. BLOW Er AL., 75 S. W. 617 (Ao.) .- Held, that in a suit to foreclose a
mortgage upon the right to manufacture and sell a patent salve, where the
mortgagor had threatened to disclose the secret formula, it was proper to
appoint a receiver without notice to the mortgagor.
It is an established principle that courts will not appoint receivers on
R. R. Co., 15 Fla. 201, until defendant has filed an answer or taken pro
motion of plaintiff, Trilbert v. Burgess, 9 Md. 452; State v. I. P. & M.
confesso. Whitehead v. Wooten, 43 Miss. 523. To this rule there is the
well-defined exception that a receiver will be appointed without notice to
defendant on clear proof that irreparable injury will result from delay.
Olmstead v. Distilling Co., 67 Fed. 24; Sims v. Adams. 78 Ala. 395; Cleve-
land, C. C. & L Ry. Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649. The court refused to
appoint a receiver on an ex parte application in Devoe v. Ithaca & Oswego
Ry. Co., 5 Paige (N. Y.) 521, but granted an injunction pending the motion.
Fraud on the part of defendant will aid plaintiff in obtaining appointment.
Voshell v. Hynson, 26 Md. 83. Defendant's remedy is immediate, and on
cause shown the order will be superseded. Gowan v. JetfriaS, 2 Ashm. (Pa.)
296.
MUNICIPAL CORIORATIONS-EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL-REPEAL OF ORDINANCF.
-CTY OF ASHLAND v. NORTHERN PAcnIc RY., 96 N. W. 688 (Wis.).-A
city passed an ordinance vacating certain streets under an agreement with
a railroad company, but the ordinance was soon afterwards repealed before
the company had acted thereon. No personal notice of the repeal was given
to the company, and it thereafter went on to expend large sums relying on
the ordinance. The city itself erected buildings on the land formerly
occupied by the streets, and took no steps to enforce the repealing ordinance.
Held, in an action commenced 13 years after the repeal, that the city was
not estopped from claiming the streets as a highway. Cassoday, C. J., and
Marshah, J., dissenting.
In support of the proposition upon which the decision seems to rest,
that no acts done after the repeal of an ordinance in reliance on the
ordinance will raise an estoppel against the city, because the other party
is bound by law to know that the ordinance has been ripealed, no authority
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has been found. The dissenting justices contended that the general attitude
of the city and public for 13 years upon the faith of which the company had
put itself in a position from which it could not recede without great pecuniary
loss, rendered it extremely inequitable in the city to now interfere; and
that, therefore, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied. That
doctrine has, in certain cases somewhat similar to the present, been applied.
Paine Lumber Co. v. Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Joliet,
79 Ill. 25. But the circumstances of the particular case must be exceptional
to warrant its application. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., sec. 675. And there, seems
to be great conflict in the authorities both as to the existence and the extent
9 f the doctrine. See 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp., secs. 667-675.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION-AMENDMENT OF BY-LAWS-CONTRACT
OF INsURANCE.-MILLER V. TUTTLE, 73 PAC. 88 (KANs.).-Plaintiff's applica-
tion for insurance contained a stipulation that he would be bound by the
by-laws of the order. The by-laws in force at the time gave power to amend.
Held, that this stipulation does not give authority to a mutual benefit asso-
ciation to adopt by-laws which will modify the insurance contract. Johnston,
C. J., Cunningham, Mason, JJ., dissenting.
Unless power to amend is reserved to the association, it does not exist.
Chadwick v. Alliance, 56 Mo. App. 463. It would seem that in the principal
case, authority to amend was reserved. The by-laws of a mutual benefit
society form a part of its contract with its members. Grand Lodge, etc.,
v. Eisner, 26 Mo. App. lo8. And they are not less elements of the contract.
of membership, because not specifically referred to in the nominal contract.
3 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d ed.), io8i. Where by-laws in force at the time
a person becomes a member provide for amendment, the members are
bound by the amendments. May v. Reserve Fund Soc., 14 Daley (N. Y.) 89.
NEGLIGENCE-PLACE ATTRACTIVE TO CHILDREN.-McCABE V. AMERICAN
WOOLEN Co., 124 FED. 283.-Held, that the maintenance of an unguarded
canal, with precipitous banks, through a thickly-settled portion of a town, is
not such negligence as will sustain a recovery for the death of a child five
years of age who fell in and was drowned.
There are many reported cases which maintain that one who has upon
his land anything in its nature attractive to children is liable for an injury
suffered by a child by reason of being attracted thereto. Some of these cases
blindly follow the lead of Stout v. R. Co., 17 Wall. 657; but this is not a
well considered case. Daniels v. R. Co., 154 Mass. I49. The others are based up-
on the doctrine announced in Keffe v. R. Co., 21 Minn. 207. But this doctrine
is untenable. "Children attracted on the premises are there, not as invitees,
but as licensees. Indermans v. Dames, L. R. I c. p. 288. Wharton, Neg.,
sec. 349. And the owner of lands owes no duty to a licensee, except not
to injure him through wilfulness, fraud or gross negligence. Gautret v.
Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 371, 375; Pollock, Torts, 425; Cooley, Torts, 304.
ORAL LICENSE-IREVOCATION.-KASTNER v. BENZ, 73 PAC. 67 (KAN.)-
Held, that in oral license given for a valuable consideration, and in reliance
upon which the licensee has expended money or labor, is irrevocable.
The question is a new one in Kansas, and the court follows the authorities
which hold that a revocation of an executed license would work a fraud
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upon the licensee, and that the licensor has estopped himself from revoking
the license. Thompson v. McElaney, 82 Pa. St. 174; Sancer v. Keller, 129
Ind. 475; Vannest v. Fleming, 79 Ia. 638. The prevailing view in England
and in many of our States, however, is that neither the execution of the
license nor the incurring of expense affect the right of the licensor. Adams
v. Andrews, 15 Q. B. 284; Cobb v. Fisher, 121 Mass. i69; Crosdale v.
Lanigan, 129 N. Y. 6o4; Lambe v. Manning, 171 Ill. 612. The better view
seems to be that the Statute of Frauds prevents any act, other than the giving
of a deed, from vesting an irrevocable interest in land. Lumber Co. v. Wilson,
I19 Mich. 406. And that so far as the question of future enjoyment is
concerned, the license may be revoked. Pitzman v. Boyce, III Mo. 387.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PURCHASE OF ADvERsE INTEREST BY AGENT-
CoNsTRucTIvE TRUST.-CALUMET, ETC.. CO. V. PHILLIPS, 72 PAC. 1064 (CAL).
-An agent of a mining corporation, while sinking a shaft on their property,
discovered a vein uponw hich another claim was located, which claim
conflicted with two claims belonging to the corporation. During his agency
he obtained title to that claim. Held, that he did not acquire the property
as agent of the corporation, so as to give rise to a constructive trust.
Where the principal had no present interest in the property purchased
by the fiduciary, the agent cannot be adjudged a trustee, though the purchase
would have been beneficial to the principal. Rogers v. Simmons, 55 Ill. 76;
Loring v. Palmer, 18 U. S. 321. Under certain circumstances, however,
the ownership of the property purchased by the fiduciary may be so essential
to the principal that a court of equity would consider a purchase by the
fiduciary in his own name a breach of trust, and hold him as a trustee.
Dickinson v. Codwise, I Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 214; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. L.
(2d ed.), 1198. In Spalding v. Mattingly, 89 Ky. 83, a distinction is noted in
the nature of the" service, as to whether it is a trust, or merely the per-
formance of an appointed service.
TAXATION-ExEmPTIONS-PENSION MONEY.-MANNING V. SPRY, 96 N.
W. 873 (IowA).-Held, that pension money paid to the guardian of an
insane pensioner, and by him loaned, is "in process of transmission to the
pensioner," and still under control of the federal government, and so is
exempt from taxation.
There is considerable diversity in the decisions as to when pension
money ceases to be "in process of transmission to the pensioner." It has
been held that although the pensioner has received the government check
and has deposited it in a bank, it does not cease to be exempt. Reiff v. Mack,
16o Pa. 265. Contra, Martin v. Bank, 6o Vt. 364; State v. Building Associa-
tion, 44 N. J. Law 376. And that land paid for with pension money and
conveyed to the pensioner's wife is exempt. Marquardt v. Mason, 87 Iowa
136; Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 644. Contra, Johnson v. Elkins, go Ky.
163. But the decided weight of authority favors a less liberal construction of
the federal statute than that of Iowa and Pennsylvania. See note to
McIntosh v. Aubrey, U. S. SUp. Ct., 46 Law Ed. 834, 185 U. S. 122, where
it was held (three justices dissenting) that land purchased with pension
money the title to which is taken in the pensioner's name, is not exempt.
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WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT.-BRiNK v. SmATToN, 68 N. E. 148 (N. Y.).-
Held, that a witness may not be interrogated as to his belief in the existence
of a Supreme Being who would punish him for false swearing, thus affecting
his credibility.
In People v. Most, 128 N. Y. ioS. this question was disposed of by the
court without discussion with the remark that "the exception to the question
put to the witness on cross-examination as to his belief in a Supreme Being
is frivolous." And the decision was the same in Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28
Barb. 265, although there the discussion of the question was obiter. But
reason and authority appear to justify the .court in overruling those decisions.
Perry's Case, 3 Grat. 632; Bush v. Com., 8o Ky. 244. The only cases ap-
parently contra may be distinguished, since they were based on a constitutional
provision that "facts which have heretofore caused the exclusion of testimony
may still be shown for the purpose of lessening its credibility." State v.
Elliott, 45 Ia. 486; Leary v. Miller, 57 Ia. 613.
